Formalized Structured Organizations Essay Sample free essay sample

Formalized associations are generally more slow in assurance formulating. Make you hold? Formalized organized associations are less natural and less agonizing upon adjustments. Compound responses to removals in the market are increasingly slow. they do non respond each piece quickly as a natural partnership would. This is primarily because of a moderate assurance doing method whereby this methodology is characterized by specific factors that essentially. do up a Formalized hierarchical development. The assurance concocting strategy requires representative commitment. executing by the enterprise in general and crystalline work process that permits data to go from one level of pecking order to the accompanying consistently. Stricter Reporting Lines Formalized hierarchical or normally depicted to hold thorough inclusion lines whereby representatives are required to recognize a progressive system when go throughing data to their higher-ups. With this in head. it is difficult for workers to speak straightforwardly to chiefs and it would take clasp to hold the issue at manus brought to the going to of the higher course. We will compose a custom paper test on Formalized Structured Organizations Essay Sample or on the other hand any comparable theme explicitly for you Don't WasteYour Time Recruit WRITER Just 13.90/page In add-on to that. non numerous representatives are engaged or lounge the approval of assurance conceiving. This hinders the technique of responding to worries in the market. A participative. comprehensive human progress is cardinal and indicating ‘fait accompli’ conclusions ( Paton. 2007 ) . Visa International is an outline of a decentralized partnership that does non distinguish the customary lines of depicting. Indeed. Visa International has received a framework whereby assurance shapers originate from the underside. as the main concern of their â€Å"employees† are the individuals who are straight associated with their stocks and administrations. Each authoritative degree gets its capacity to do judgments from the lower degrees of hierarchical development rather than the 1s from above ( Laubacher A ; Morton. 2003 ) . Smaller Lines of Control Due to their smaller lines of control. assurance conceiving by a formalistic association would be uneffective as it would non advance representative commitment a similar way a naturally organized association would. Successful assurance conceiving is a basic achievement for any chief. also, basic to the smooth activity of the association in general. Ambivalent chiefs are a channel on the organization and a significant annihilation for their crews. harming representative thought process which can in twist sabotage productiveness and effect the organization’s progression ( Jones. 2007 ) . There are obviously a figure of variables which can take to awful assurance formulating however it is particularly troubling that chiefs are fail to influence others as they put programs in topographic point ( Jones. 2007 ) . Otis Elevator Corporation introduced an incorporated framework for representatives at land degree to depict stock deformities to assurance shapers. This diminishes vitality and clasp spent in be givening to concerns ( Laubacher A ; Morton. 2003 ). Not so much Transparency but rather more Bureaucracy Formalized association developments are typically tormented with bureaucratism and formality. This goes about as a hinderance upon data transparence. At the point when data is stuck along the inclusion lines. it is difficult for workers to pass on with their chiefs when there are no roads for them to show their positions. These organizations will in general follow conventional strategies for imparting and are all things considered non great familiar with new designing, for example, open introduction/net incomes logs. grapevines and messaging. Business and building are presently an individual framework and organizations will stand up to a much more noteworthy interest to keep up. Continuous dish to better quality data will be the best worry in addition to in the mature ages in front ( especially for dynamic ) ( Teradata. 2006 ) . Wal-Mart ( Wal-Mart ) Corporation embraces a following framework to let various its numerous braches to follow removals in shopper requests and buys. This aides Wal-Mart all in all point of convergence on the stocks they have to offer in various parts ( Laubacher A ; Morton. 2003 ) . Notices: Drummond H.The Art of Decision Making: Mirrors of Imagination. Veils of Fate. Wiley New York ( 2003 ) . Endeavor Decision Making Survey 2006 Report.Penetrations from the Fifth Annual Teradata Survey ( 2006 ) . hypertext move convention:/www. the board issues. com Laubacher. R. A ; Morton.M. S. S. Concocting the Organization of the 21stCentury. Sloan School of Management. ( 2003 ) . Paton. N.British Directors Dithering and Incompetent. The board Issues ( 2007 ) .

Reflective writing baased on Full Body burden Essay

Intelligent composing baased on Full Body trouble - Essay Example Moreover, Kristine gives perusers her spell at the weaponry office where she was utilized to work for a brief term of time. In as much as a few ideas are apparent in the book, it is crucial to investigate the realities and fictions that came out through Karen’s portrayal of the Colorado plant. Actuality is characterized as a thing that is known and has been demonstrated valid while fiction is something that isn't right and false. While growing up and working for Rocky Plants atomic weapon, Kristine experienced various difficulties and encounters; some are realities while others are fictions (Iversen 3). I find that Kristine’s portrayal adjusted among realities and fictions that assist perusers with having a similar perspective. The writer authentically uncovers her own life to perusers in an open way. The occasions that encompassed her own life, for example, having a heavy drinker father and working at the atomic manufacturing plant molded her life and gave her the enco unters she expected to compose the book. I consider the disclosure of these privileged insights significant for the improvement of the story since they were authentic (Iversen 31). As indicated by Kristine, she got the data required for the advancement of the book from the meetings she led on the individuals, both from the area and from the plant. This is invented in light of the fact that she doesn't reveal to us the techniques she utilized for the meetings. Moreover, she is making careful effort to outline how she certified the information. The representations are genuine in light of the fact that they depend on encounters. This is on the grounds that it is a first individual portrayal. She was at a similar spot where occasions were occurring. I think that its precarious to decide realities in a circumstance where the individuals to be met have ambiguous recollections. Therefore, I accept that the author’s memory of her family’s recollections is bogus. This is owing to the way that she straightforwardly cited a portion of the discussions she had with individuals from the family. She brought up precisely what her sister was doing while on her date. This is fiction in light of the fact that the creator neglects to announce that she talked with her sister. Conventionally, this can't be real in light of the fact that the time span can't permit people to review the specific words said over 10 years prior. This is on the grounds that she went through twelve years dealing with the book (Iversen 301). Kristine takes us through the exposed realities concerning the plant while uncovering the once concealed insider facts about the atomic plant. The legislature had at first misled the residents of Colorado about the dealings of the plant. Nonetheless, when Kristine uncovered the harms that the general condition had experienced because of atomic weapons removal by the manufacturing plant, it unveiled the stunning concealment by the US government. Furthermor e, the radiations from the processing plant caused hurt not exclusively to the earth yet in addition to human wellbeing. This is on the grounds that few individuals were determined to have disease. The manufacturing plant was shut in light of these disclosures. I find such sort of revelation by the creator verifiable. Something else, the industrial facility would even now be working had the accounts been invented. A pivotal part of the book is depicted in section sixteen. The creator features the decay of a family. Kristine uncovers the enthusiastic disengage that her family had with their alcoholic dad. This liquor addiction nearly caused them their lives when her dad was driving when inebriated. In spite of the fact that the author’s father was a legal counselor, he continually confronted issue with the law due to

Risk management for Macville

Question: Talk about the Risk the board for Macville. Answer: Presentation: There are different dangers related with any completely utilitarian business activity, including robbery, misrepresentation and so forth. The harm to the business activity by the hazard can hugy affect the business activity and procedures relying upon the greatness and event recurrence of the hazard (McNeil, Frey Embrechts, 2015). This task will endeavor to survey and assess the hazard circumstance that have emerged for the reproduced business situation for Macville and actualize a hazard the executives activity plan that with chance treatment choices Hazard investigation report: For the reproduced business situation the Macville visit and examination has indentified four potential dangers that can hurt the operational wellbeing of the association. So as to investigate singular dangers it is imperative to evaluate the probability, outcome, hazard grid scoring and most conceivable treatment for each hazard. Banking burglary: Probability: The probability of the money burglary from the premises can happen effectively (Lam, 2014). Inside the initial scarcely any, prior months appropriate security is set up for the store the potential for overnight burglary will remain. Outcome: upon the gathering with the administration board it was found that short-term robbery of money surrendered on premises over to $4000 won't have significant ramifications for the association anyway different events may detrimentally affect the budgetary standing. Treatment choice: The most conceivable treatment for money robbery from the premises will be the burglary money protection for the store and setting up cutting edge and productive security framework (Lam, 2014). Chiefs travel hazard: Probability: The head supervisor has a great deal of obligations upon their shoulders, and at times they need to travel a ton too. Any danger of physical injury to the supervisor can be a feasible circumstance in the beginning of limited time exercises for the store. The supervisor can wish to request foul pay from the administration Outcomes: The results of a hazard like that will be minor with the chance of the store staying without the oversight of the administrator. Treatment: The answer for this circumstance can be a set wellbeing plan for the representatives which will cover any unintentional or non unplanned wellbeing complexities. Other than that care ought to be taken to guarantee for the security and prosperity of the staff during limited time visits (Kaplan Mikes, 2012) Law consistence hazard: Probability: Law consistence is one of the most significant divisions that can present tremendous difficulties in the way for the development of the store (Hopkin, 2017). The probability of the store workers not clinging to the ordinances is likely, inside the finish of opening week. Outcomes: The gathering with the administration uncovered that the Toowoomba Council watches will guarantee any rebelliousness to be effectively uncovered and afterward results of that can be profoundly unfavorable to the store Treatment: The best way to guarantee that the staff clings to the laws and guidelines is organizing an observing framework that will ignore and correct any occurrences of resistance heretofore. Other than that fusing punishment framework for absence of consistence can be possible to the association (Hopkin, 2017). Danger of loss of brand acknowledgment: Probability: There can be a great deal of occasions where the organization workers probably won't consent to the brand advancement techniques (Ghadge, Dani Kalawsky, 2012). For instance the vast majority of the staff are aware of their dressing style and may differ to wear the store shirt promptly, its probability can be inside the initial three months. Outcomes: The results of a portion of the staff not consenting to do mark advancement can be impeding to the brand advancement and the absence of going along disposition of the staff can influence the shopper reaction. Anyway with the greater part of the workers being responsive to the business necessities the outcomes of beginning rebelliousness will be minor. Treatment: There is requirement for restricting arrangements in the agreement that will be disclosed to the staff at the hour of acceptance so they follow it. On the off chance that a portion of the staff doesn't comprehend the seriousness of the enlistment provision they ought to be talked about with the administration. The measures ought to be observed also (Ghadge, Dani Kalawsky, 2012). Hazard network examination: Hazard rating Need Reaction Scoring Hazard to loss of brand acknowledgment low None or long haul 4 Hazard to expedite burglary Low to medium medium term 8 Danger of physical injury to the senior supervisor Medium to high present moment 12 Hazard or rebelliousness to by laws High to extremely high Right away 16 Hazard lattice examination (Duijm, 2015) Hazard the executives activity plan: Hazard Survey Risk (Score) Controls Checking Activity Priority (1-5) Courses of events Mindful Money burglary chance 4 Upgrade security Empower alert frameworks Join robbery protection (Aven, 2015) Observing the safety efforts taken Evaluating the protection spread for the store robbery 1 Long haul The administration and hazard investigation group Loss of brand acknowledgment hazard 8 Incorporate clothing standard approach as anon debatable condition in the enlistment contract Clarify and rouse the representative to go along (Aven, 2015) Observing the representatives for the adherence to clothing standard approach. 2 Medium term The human asset group and the hazard investigation group Hazard Evaluate Risk (Score) Controls Observing Activity Priority (1-5) Courses of events Dependable Travel hazard to head supervisor 12 Start wellbeing spread designs for the representatives (Booth, 2015) Observing the medical coverage plan created for the workers 3 Present moment The human asset group and the hazard examination group Hazard to not going along to by laws 16 Counting punishment framework for the workers Disclosing to the staff the results of not consenting to by laws (Duijm, 2015) Checking the staff for consistence Forcing punishments where important to set up positive model 4-5 Prompt The board and the hazard examination group End: Dangers are related with any expert endeavor, and its event is essentially outlandish at the majority of times. There fire there must be powerful hazard the executives that can address any unsafe circumstance emerging that can hurt the manageability of the business in the market. On a finishing up note it very well may be said that despite the fact that Macville has various dangers as related with their business activity however greater part of them are minor dangers. With the effective usage of hazard the board techniques and strategies these dangers can be kept away from. References: Aven, T. (2015).Risk examination. John Wiley Sons. Stall, S. A. (2015).Crisis administration technique: Competition and change in current ventures. Routledge. Duijm, N. J. (2015). Proposals on the utilization and plan of hazard matrices.Safety science,76, 21-31. Ghadge, A., Dani, S., Kalawsky, R. (2012). Flexibly chain chance administration: present and future scope.The International Journal of Logistics Management,23(3), 313-339. Hopkin, P. (2017).Fundamentals of hazard the executives: understanding, assessing and actualizing viable hazard the board. Kogan Page Publishers. Kaplan, R. S., Mikes, A. (2012). Overseeing dangers: another structure. Lam, J. (2014).Enterprise hazard the board: from motivating forces to controls. John Wiley Sons. McNeil, A. J., Frey, R., Embrechts, P. (2015).Quantitative hazard the executives: Concepts, procedures and instruments. Princeton college press.

Customer service Chapter 1 and 2 Essay Example For Students

Client assistance Chapter 1 and 2 Essay Part 1 Review Questions. 1 . Administration is the way wherein you and different workers treat your clients and each other as you convey your companys expectations. 2. In the past when numerous individuals chipped away at the homesteads, little craftsman and entrepreneur give client assistance to their neighbors. Numerous unassuming communities and towns had their own metalworker, general stores, barbershop, and comparable help arranged foundations claimed and worked by individuals living in the town. For individuals living in progressively provincial territories, sellers of kitchenware, medication, and different merchandise advanced from on the spot to nother area to serve their clients and disseminated different items. 3. Organizations have changed drastically as the economy has moved from a reliance on assembling to an emphasis on offering opportune quality assistance. The improvement of worldwide quality standard by which adequacy is estimated in numerous global associations. In view of the worldwide idea of the business, numerous organizations decide to utilize redistributing client care work. 4. Following are a portion of the reasons for the changing industry condition in late decades: Global financial movements Shifts in the populace and work power Increased proficiency in innovation Deregulation of numerous ventures Geopolitical changes Increase in the quantity of cubicle laborers More ladies are entering the workforce An all the more racially and ethnically differing populace is entering the workforce more established specialists entering the workforce Growth in web based business 5. Organization culture incorporates the dynamic nature if the association and envelops the qualities and convictions that is imperative to the association and its representatives and supervisor. The experience, mentalities, and standards treasured and maintained by the workers and groups inside the association set the pace and way n which administration is conveyed and how specialist co-ops cooperate with both interior and outer clients. 6. During the employing procedure, an exhaustive screening procedure will be likely used to recognize abilities, information, and aptitudes. Without propelled, skillful laborer, any arranging, strategy, and methodology change or framework adjustment won't have any kind of effect in client support. 7. Quality and amount are two variables identified with an associations items or expectations that can prompt consumer loyalty or disappointment. 8. At the point when association chooses a conveyance technique for roducts and administrations, associations look at the accompanying components. Industry principles Customer desire Capabilities Costs current ana anticipated prerequisites 9. The six key parts of a client support condition are: 1 . The client 2. Hierarchical culture 3. HR 4. Items/expectations 5. Conveyance frameworks 6. Administration 10. Numerous associations are changing to learning associations, since frameworks and procedures are constantly analyzed and refreshed. Gaining from botch, and adjusting as needs be, is urgent for associations achievement. Search it out Posting of Books on themes present in this section A Guide to Customer Service Skills for the Service Desk Professional Customer Service and Professionalism: Twenty-five Successful, Professional Women Share Their Powerful Tips for Image, Attitude, and Behavior in the Workplace Customer Service for Professionals in Health Care Customer Tells: Delivering World-Class Customer Service by Reading Your Signs and Signals Invisible Profits: The Power of Exceptional Customer Service Perfect Phrases for Customer Service, Second Edition Sales and Service for the Wine Professional Survival Spanish for Customer Service The Compassionate Geek: Mastering Customer Service for I. T. Experts Winning the Professional Services Sale Three organizations that I accept have adjusted a positive client assistance 1 . BMW 2. Toyota 3. General Motors Face to Face 1. I think I have individuals ability; I attempt to clarify the thing in a manner they can comprehend without utilizing specialized terms. 2. What are my impediments, when managing client grumblings? Will I approach all the apparatuses I have to carry out my Responsibility viably? Will you be accessible on the off chance that I have any inquiries? 3. On the off chance that a client request an assistance that PackAll doesn't give. Discussion - Sports Starts Get Paid To Much (Affirmative) EssaySome methodologies for advancing a positive client culture are: Explore your associations vision Help impart the way of life and vision to client day by day Demonstrate moral conduct Identify and improve your client abilities Become a specialist on your association Demonstrate responsibility Partner with clients Work in light of your clients intrigue Treat merchants and providers as clients Share assets Work with, not against, your client Provide administration follow-up 9. Normal associations can be isolated from brilliant ones by figuring out what sort of administration condition exists: Executives invest energy with the clients. Administrators invest energy conversing with bleeding edge specialist organizations. Client input is consistently asked and followed up on. Advancement and inventiveness are supported and remunerated. Benchmarking is finished with comparative associations. Innovation is across the board, much of the time refreshed, and utilized successfully. Preparing is given to keep workers current on industry patterns, hierarchical issues, aptitudes, and innovation. Open correspondence exists between forefront representatives and all degrees of administrations. Representatives are furnished with rules and engaged to do whatever is important to fulfill client. Association with clients and providers are normal. The norm isn't worthy. 10. Following are some common things that client needs: Personal acknowledgment Courtesy Timely assistance Professionalism Enthusiastic help Empathy Patience Search it out Provide backing and shields for Florida Hospital, specialists, inquire about colleagues, investigate subjects, and information to guarantee honesty of research at Florida Hospital Our central goal: to move and sustain the human soul one individual, each cup and one neighborhood in turn. Our central goal is to satisfy the car and business truck rental, renting, vehicle deals and related needs of our clients and, in doing as such, surpass their desires for administration, quality and worth. The USAA toucatlonal Younaatlon offers you tne opportunlty to De netter InTormea ana repared to settle on the best decisions through each phase of life. Our broad library of free instructive materials gives believable and helpful data that addresses an assortment of subjects and gives you instructive data that is objective, important and usable EDs crucial to advance understudy accomplishment and groundwork for worldwide intensity by cultivating instructive greatness and guaranteeing equivalent access Yes there are shared qualities and conviction apparent in the distinctive statements of purpose. Client assistance Willingness for development Provide various choices As a client/customer, I do feel the association esteems me. Since, if client isn't there to purchase their item/administration, they won't have any motivation to do on what they do. Truly, the focal point of every kind of association appears to contrast between sorts of association. Government associations commonly don't put bunches of accentuation on client, in light of the fact that the client doesn't have some other choice. Non-benefit association appears to concentrate on prosperity of target client. Benefit association, they appears to have alluring crucial advance their item or administrations. 2. http://blog. spoken. com/2010/10/cost-of-obtaining another client 6-to-7-times-more-than-keeping-exisiting. ml http://iterativepath. wordpress. com/2013/02/03/it-costs-6-7-times-more-to-secure new-clients over-holding existing-ones/Face to confront 1 . Indeed there are pointers of United Booksellers administrations culture. They give broad client care preparing before being permitted to collaborate with clients. They care about consumer loyalt y 2. I would follow associations server culture to offer the assistance client was getting previously and propose the need of progress if there is any. 3. I would expect the administration they are known for. Since that is the reason I am there as a client.

How Mountains Are Formed :: Informative Essays

How Are Mountains Formed? Â Â Â Â Â Mountains are shaped over extensive stretches of time by powers of the earth. Mountains just don’t show up in wherever. Most are framed when plates, or enormous bits of the Earth’s hull, pull and push against one another. Amazing mountain ranges are framed by the development of structural plates. Convection flows somewhere down in the mantle of the earth, starts to gush towards the surface. As the weight expands, it gets the crustal plates under way. There are various types of mountains - Volcanic, Folded, Fault-square, and Arch mountains. Volcanic mountains are framed when magma comes up through breaks in the Earth’s hull and bursts out magma and debris. The Hawaiian volcanoes, Mt. Hood, Mt. Etna, Vesuvius, and Mt. Holy person Helens are instances of volcanic mountains. Rocks are hard however in time they can twist or crease delivering Folded mountains. The Alps shaped as the Eurasian plate pushed against the African plate. Different instances of collapsed mountains are the Rockies, Himalayas, Appalayas, and the Andes. Shortcoming square mountains are shaped when one plate pushes or pulls from another plate. In the Earth, hot flows of magma or liquid stone may gush and break the debilitated outside above. As the outside layer breaks, squares of rock rise or fall shaping Deficiency square mountains. Instances of these mountains are the Sierra Nevada in California and the Grand Tetons in Wyoming. Arch mountains are shaped by a similar sort of liquid stone that structures Volcanic mountains. As magma comes up in a break in the Earth’s hull, it doesn't rise to the top, however the liquid stone pushes the ground up into an arch. Models are Yosemite’s Half Dome, the Adirondacks in New York, and the Black Hills in South Dakota.Some mountains began at the base of the ocean. How Mountains Are Formed :: Informative Essays How Are Mountains Formed? Â Â Â Â Â Mountains are framed over significant stretches of time by powers of the earth. Mountains just don’t show up in wherever. Most are framed when plates, or immense bits of the Earth’s covering, pull and push against one another. Fantastic mountain ranges are shaped by the development of structural plates. Convection flows somewhere down in the mantle of the earth, starts to gush towards the surface. As the weight builds, it gets the crustal plates under way. There are various types of mountains - Volcanic, Folded, Fault-square, and Vault mountains. Volcanic mountains are shaped when magma comes up through splits in the Earth’s covering and bursts out magma and debris. The Hawaiian volcanoes, Mt. Hood, Mt. Etna, Vesuvius, and Mt. Holy person Helens are instances of volcanic mountains. Rocks are hard yet in time they can twist or overlay creating Folded mountains. The Alps shaped as the Eurasian plate pushed against the African plate. Different instances of collapsed mountains are the Rockies, Himalayas, Appalayas, and the Andes. Flaw square mountains are framed when one plate pushes or pulls from another plate. In the Earth, hot flows of magma or liquid stone may gush and break the debilitated outside layer above. As the hull breaks, squares of rock rise or fall framing Issue square mountains. Instances of these mountains are the Sierra Nevada in California and the Grand Tetons in Wyoming. Vault mountains are framed by a similar sort of liquid stone that structures Volcanic mountains. As magma comes up in a split in the Earth’s covering, it doesn't rise to the top, however the liquid stone pushes the ground up into a vault. Models are Yosemite’s Half Dome, the Adirondacks in New York, and the Black Hills in South Dakota.Some mountains began at the base of the ocean.

How to Make Teaching Online Your Next Side Gig

How to Make Teaching Online Your Next Side Gig TeacherVision partnered with VIPKid to break down how you can make teaching online your next side gig. Together, we highlight how to prepare to teach online, and include three different scenarios for what the opportunity might look like. by Julie Mason Chances are you have a side hustle or you are looking for a side hustle. With rising costs of living and flat-lined teaching salaries, supplementing an educator’s salary has become a must-do rather than a may-do. Here’s the good news: instead of taking on additional work that is disconnected from your teaching expertise and skills or requires you to leave your house and plan your schedule around it, you can teach online. Teaching online is a relatively new option for classroom teachers, and chances are you have some questions about the logistics and how to get started. We partnered with VIPKid in order to unpack the logistics and realities of teaching online. What Are the Qualifications? Most online tutoring and teaching companies, including VIPKid require the following qualifications and skills: A Bachelor’s Degree At least one year of experience working with students (though this could include teaching, tutoring, babysitting, camp counselor, parenting, etc.) Eligibility to work in the United States or Canada ESL teaching experience is not required, but preferred A teaching certification is not required, but preferred   What Setup Do I Need? Because you will teach remotely, it is your responsibility to make sure that you have the necessary setup and equipment. However, these items are often these are things you already have in your home. Here are some things you will need before you get started: A computer with a microphone and a camera A strong and working internet connection A well-lit space that is professional and welcoming for students (suggested) Teaching essentials: dry erase board, dry erase markers, teaching posters, props, etc. (suggested)   How Does the Application Process Work? In order to make sure that you have the qualifications and skills needed to teach online, the application process for teaching online is similar to the process of teaching in a classroom. Make sure you have all the qualifications Complete an online form with your basic information and experience (no resume needed) Complete a short demo class (often this is live or recorded and reference materials are provided) Before your demo lesson, review the applicant performance indicators for how you will be evaluated. Teach a full mock class (you can often re-do if unsuccessful on first attempt) Sign your contract and upload your documents( e.g. teaching certificate, degree, picture, etc). Pass a Background check   When Will I Teach and For How Long? As you begin to think about making online teaching your next side gig, you might wonder how this actually will work and what it will look like. While this side gig provides immense flexibility, you will need to have a sense of your schedule and availability in advance, and you will need to commit to the work for a set period of time. For example, VIPKId generally runs like this: Teachers commit to a 6th month minimum contract There is no minimum requirement for how many classes you must teach, and no maximum for how many classes you can teach You enter your weekly availability in advance Classes are 25 minutes long Some online teachers note that he most requested teaching times from parents are Monday-Friday 6:00AM-10:00 AM EST, and Saturday and Sunday 9:00AM-10:00PM EST What Will I Teach? How Much Do I Need to Prepare? Teachers know that the amount of preparation needed for teaching takes time, and that after the teaching is done, there is grading and communication with parents. One of the reasons why online teaching is a reasonable side gig is because the bulk of the work that goes into teaching is eliminated. When you teach online with VIPKid: The curriculum is provided for you Parent communication is done for you Classes are 1:1 The curriculum is made up of pre-made slides and is aligned to the Common Core The classes are hosted on VIPKid’s platform   Scenario #1: Teach online before school If you are up early, teaching online in the mornings might work best. You may want to start by choosing two mornings/week, and then expand your hours as you adjust to your side gig. One of the benefits of online teaching in the mornings is that these hours are in high demand and parents are eager to connect their child with a teacher. Another benefit is that your weekends are truly a break from work and teaching. Scenario #2: Teach online in the evenings and on the weekends If significantly supplementing your income is a priority, and you have the time and flexibility, making yourself available to teach online in the evenings and on the weekends can result in the most compensation. Since many offline teaching jobs require that you have a Master’s degree, paying off student loans affects many if not most educators. Because there is no maximum for how many hours you can teach online, this side gig is ideal for the teacher who needs consistent supplemental income. Scenario #3: Mix It Up Be honest with yourself about your availability, not only in terms of when you can teach online, but in terms of when you want to teach online. Work-life balance and self-care is essential for teachers. While a side gig might be necessary, rest, exercise, and time with family and friends is important for your health. One of the benefits of mixing it up is ensuring that your side gig doesn’t become too much. You might decide that you want to teach on Tuesday evenings and Sundays to start, and you can always add hours as you go. Because you can adjust as you go, you can continue to find and change up the mix that works best for you. Online teaching is an ideal teacher side hustle because it provides an opportunity to do what you know and love, doesn’t require another commute or set schedule, and will provide extra income to increase your financial security and well-being. Interested in learning more about online teaching? Check out our online teaching hub, which is full of additional resources.   Julie Mason is the Head of Curriculum and Content for TeacherVision. She taught middle and high school English for eight years, and then worked as an instructional coach, supporting K-12 teachers to blend and personalize their classrooms.

2019 NCCPA PANCE Content Blueprint Updates

Did you know that the NCCPA has updated the PANCE Content Blueprint for 2019? With the update came some changes both to my SMARTYPANCE Board Review Website and your board review checklist which I will be discussing here in detail. NCCPA PANCE Content Blueprint 2019 vs. 2018 The Big Changes The biggest change comes in the form of a new renalsystem section as an offshoot ofthe GU section. TheGU section which waspreviously6% is now5% and the new renal section constitutes5% of the PANCE exam. Thismeans there ismoreGU on the exam. Exciting for the lovers ofacid-base, but somewhat sad for the rest of us. A second big change has to do with how the blueprint covers neoplasms, for example, in the dermatology blueprint system there used to be four cancerous lesions listed under the section of dermatologic neoplasms. In the GI and Nutrition system neoplasms were listed under each sectionsuch as esophageal neoplasms, neoplasms of the stomach, neoplasms of the liver, the pancreas, and the rectum. In the 2019PANCE content blueprint, these have been removed with the creation of a new section of GI neoplasms - benign and malignant. The same changes are also seen in the musculoskeletal system, the neurologic system, the reproductive system, dermatology system, and EENT sections. Below is a summary of changes for all 13 systemsincludinga quick breakdown of the shiny new renal system. PANCE Contact Blueprint Systems with percentageincreases include: Endocrine: increased by 1% Hematology: increased by 2% Infectious disease: increased by 3% Renal: new system PANCE Contact Blueprint Systems with percentagedecreases include: Cardiology: decreased by 3% EENT: decreased by 2% GI/Nutrition: decreased by 1% GU: decreased by 1% Musculoskeletal: decreased by 2% Pulmonary: decreased by 2% Reproductive: decreased by 1% PANCE Contact Blueprint Systems in which the percentageremained the same include: Dermatology: 5% Psychiatry: 6% 1. PANCE Cardiology System2019 Updates (was 16% is now 13%) The cardiology system of the PANCE blueprint changed very little. The biggest change is a reduction in exam percentage with a decrease from 16% to 13% of your board exam. Other forms of heart disease have been removed and the topics within this section, acute and subacute bacterial endocarditis, acute pericarditis, cardiac tamponade, and pericardial effusion have been placed under a new section called traumatic, infectious, and inflammatory heart conditions. Valvular disorders have been simplified. From a review standpoint though, it is essentially it's the same you still need to know four valves and whether they are stenosed, regurgitating, or prolapsed. Lipid disorders(which were previously part of the endocrinology blueprint) have been broughtinto the cardiology section where they belong. New additions include: Sinus arrhythmia Vasovagalhypotension 2. PANCE Dermatology System2019 Updates (still 5%) The percent stays the same at 5% of your exam. DyshidrosisandLichen simplex chronicushave been removed from the blueprint. Basal cell carcinoma,Kaposi sarcoma, Melanoma, andSquamous cell carcinomahave been combined into one neoplasms section - benigh, malignant, and premalignant. The Other Dermatological Conditions section has been reduced and much of the contents have been recategorized, in this section is a new category of photosensitive reactions. Spider bites are now part of a new section titledEnvenomations and arthropod bite reactions. New sectionsinclude folliculitis, infectious disease, hand foot and mouthdisease, parasitic section, keratitis disorders section, pigment disorders section, skin integrity, lacerations, and stasis dermatitis, vascular abnormalities including cherry angioma, telangiectasia, and pemphigus. 3. PANCE Endocrine System2019 Updates (was 6% is now 7%) The percentage increases by 1% from 6% to 7% of your PANCE exam. The neoplastic diseases section has been expanded with the addition of four new lessons:Multiple endocrine neoplasia,Neoplastic syndrome,Primary endocrine malignancy, and Syndrome of inappropriate antidiuretic hormone secretion (SIADH). The parathyroid disorders have been moved to their own section. As mentioned above the lipid disorders section which included bothHypercholesterolemiaandHypertriglyceridemiahave been moved to the Cardiology system blueprint. 4. PANCE Eyes, Ears, Nose and Throat 2019 Updates (was 9% is now 7%) The EENT PANCE content blueprint section has seen some big changes, not in content but in organization. With eye disorders alone seeing the creation of 7 new "subcategories" as follows: Conjunctival disorders Corneal disorders: new sections infectious and keratitis. Lacrimal disorders Lid disorders Neuro-ophthalmologic disorders Traumatic disorders: new section on globe rupture Vascular disorders Vision abnormalities: with three new sections including amaurosis fugax, amblyopia and scleritis. Ear disorders also have seen similar subdivision. Now divided into external ear, internal ear, middle disorders, and other abnormalities of the ear with the addition of cerumen impaction and trauma to the blueprint. Nose and sinus disorders now include a section on trauma and the oropharyngeal disorders section now includes a subsection of infectious/inflammatory disorders, salivary disorders, trauma and other and a new section on deep neck infection. Removed sections include benign and malignant neoplasms, foreign body, and hematoma of the external ear. 5. PANCE GI/Nutrition 2019 Updates (was 8% is now 7%) The percentage of GI and Nutrition has decreased by 1% of the PANCE exam. The biggest changes are seen in the metabolic disorders section of the blueprint which has now been nicely broken down into four new topics:G6PD deficiency,Paget disease,Phenylketonuria, and Rickets. Vitamin and nutritional deficiencies have earned a news section titled hyper and hypovitaminosis. We see a new section called food allergies and food sensitivities which includeGluten intoleranceandLactose intolerance, and now includes a new topic "nut allergies." The rectum section has been removed andAbscess/fistula, Anal fissure, Fecal impaction, and Hemorrhoidsare now included as part of the section "colorectal disorders." Obstruction is now broken down into small bowel (SBO) and large bowel obstruction sections, and the neoplasm section which was previously divided into rectal neoplasms, Small intestine neoplasms,esophageal neoplasms, pancreatic neoplasms, hepatic neoplasms and gastric neoplasmsis simply benign and malignant. 6. PANCE Genitourinary System 2019 Updates (was 10% is now 5%) Besides the name change to "Genitourinary Male and Female" the big change (as mentioned above) is the removal of renal from GU and the creation of a new Renal blueprint section. With hat has come some much-needed reorganization into new GU subdivisions. There is a new section titled bladder disorders which includesincontinenceplus the addition of two new topics: overactive bladder and bladder prolapse. Congenital abnormalities get's its own section titled congenital and acquired abnormalities, which includescryptorchidismalong with three new topics, Peyronie disease, trauma, and vesicoureteral reflux. There is a new human sexuality section (don't know exactly what to make of this). Neoplasms now include penile cancer and there is a new penile disorders section with a new topic for hypospadias/epispadias. There is a new subsection for prostate disorders and testicular disorders. A new urethral disorders subsection has been created which includes two new topics: prolapse and stricture. All the renal material has been relocated to the new renal section. 7. PANCE Hematologic System 2019 Updates (was 3% is now 7%) The percentage is up by 2% for the hematology system! New subsections include: Autoimmune disorders cytopenias: anemia and leukopenia - which now simplifies/combines most of what has been removed specifically all individual sections previously pertaining to anemia: Anemias Anemia of chronic disease Aplastic anemia Folate deficiency G6PD deficiency Hemolytic anemia Iron deficiency Vitamin B12 deficiency Cytoses: polycythemia and thrombocytosis Hemoglobinopathies with a new topic - hemochromatosis Immunologic disorders:Transfusion reaction Once again hematologic malignancies have been changed/revised some with the addition of myelodysplasia. Also removed from the hematology blueprint are the following two subsystems:Idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpuraandThrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura. 8. PANCE Infectious Disease System 2019 Updates (was 3% is now 6%) Percentage of the exam has been doubled from 3%-6%. Everything from the previous blueprint has been rolled over into the 2018 edition plus the addition of some new lessons. IncludingMethicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection, ad a new subsection for prenatal transmission of disorders which includes: Congenital varicella Herpes simplex virus Human papillomavirus Zika virus There is a new section titledSepsis/systemic inflammatory response syndrome. 9. PANCE Musculoskeletal System 2019 Updates (was 10% is now 8%) There were some big changes to the musculoskeletal system. Here is all that has been removed and relocated. Lower back pain Disorders of the Hip, Disorders of the Shoulder Fractures/dislocations Soft tissue injuries Disorders of the Forearm/Wrist/Hand Fractures/dislocations Soft tissue injuries Disorders of the Knee Fractures/dislocations Osgood-Schlatter disease Soft tissue injuries Disorders of the Ankle/Foot Fractures/dislocations Soft tissue injuries Neoplastic Disease Bone cysts/tumors Where did it all go? Basically, there are two new all-encompassing sections: Lower extremity disorders upper extremity disorders There has been a much needed new section for spinal disorders which the addition of thoracic outlet syndrome, torticollis, and trauma. There is also a new chest/rib disorders section. And, again, neoplasms are now grouped into one section of both benign and malignant neoplasms. 10. PANCE Neurologic System 2019 Updates (was 6% is now 7%) The neurology PANCE blueprint system has increased by one percentage point from six to seven percent. Other Neurologic Disordershas been condensed and reorganized with the addition of three new sections: Neurocognitive disorders: which includesDeliriumand a new topic titledMajor/mild neurocognitive disorders Neuromuscular disorders Neoplasms Other additions include: a section for closed head injuries with a topic of traumatic brain injuries, a special new section for cranial nerve palsies, encephalopathic disorders, neuromuscular disorders, peripheral nerve disorders including carpal tunnel syndrome, an expansion of seizure disorders which now includes topics specific to focal and generalized seizures and last but not least the addition of arteriovenous malformations to the vascular disorders subsection. 11. PANCE Psychiatry/Behavior Science 2019 Updates (same 6%) The psychiatry section percentage of the PANE Blueprint remains at 6% There are quite a few new additions to the 2019 PANCE blueprint: Abuse and neglect: which now includes elder abuse and sexual abuse Depressive disorders: Persistent depressive disorders, premenstrual dysphoric disorder Disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorders Dissociative disorders Human sexuality Obsessive-compulsive and related disorders Neurodevelopmental disorders Sleep-wake disorders: narcolepsy and parasomnias Trama-and stressor-related disorders Feeding and eating disorders (previously anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and obesity) The following have been removed/update for the 2019 PANCE Blueprint: Anorexia nervosa Bulimia nervosa Obesity Mood Disorders Dysthymic Psychoses Delusional disorder Schizophrenia Abuse Dependence Withdrawal Other Behavior/Emotional Disorders Acute reaction to stress Child/elder abuse Grief reaction 12. PANCE Pulmonary System 2019 Updates (was 12% now 10%) The pulmonary blueprint sees a 10% decrease in percentage from 12% - 10% but overall there were very few changes. There was only one topic removed from the pulmonary blueprint (bronchiectasis) although consider it part of the RSV section. There was one new additionSleep apnea/Obesity hypoventilation syndrome other than that, nothing too exciting going on here. 13. PANCE Renal System 2019 (5%) Sorry GU there is a new girl in town and her name is Renal! As mentioned above one of the biggest additions to the 2019 PANCE blueprint is the new renal system blueprint. That being said, it is more of an organizational change than one of content. The new renal system blueprint adds only three new topics: Horseshoe kidney Dehydration Hyperkalemia/hypokalemia Other than that the rest is pretty much the same renal section we have come to love and know... I.E you still have to memorize acid-base! Arghhh! 14. PANCE Reproductive (Male and Female) 2019 (5%) The reproductive system of the PANCE blueprint has decreased by 1% The reproductive system of the 2019 blueprint remains much the same, with the addition of breech presentation and cord prolapse to complicated pregnancy, another human sexuality section (if you have been keeping track this is the third - the other are located in GU and Psychiatry. Neoplasms once again find their new home with the removal and consolidation of all GYN neoplasms (Breast Cancer,Cervical Cancer,Ovarian neoplasms,Endometrial cancer ) into two sections: benign and malignant. Gone also are the following topics: Dysfunctional uterine bleeding Amenorrhea Vulvar vaginal neoplasm Premenstrual syndrome Dysmenorrhea Cesarean section New to the reproductive system are two new disorders of the ovary: Polycystic ovarian syndrome and ovarian torsion, a new trauma subsection which includes physical assault, sexual assault and trauma in pregnancy and a new subsection of uncomplicated pregnancy for prenatal and postnatal care, which I think is a wonderful addition. The 2019 PANCE Content Blueprint Checklist Preview As an update to the 2018 version, I have created a developmental version of the 2019 checklist demonstrating the changes with links to corresponding sections. The official checklist will be released later this year as the new lessons on smartypance.com go live. You can download the developmental version which includes the 2018 template along with the new changeshere. 2019 Blueprint Checklist Preview You may also like -Episode 61: The Audio PANCE and PANRE Board Review Podcast Ten MixedNCCPA PANCE Content Blueprint Multiple Choice Questions Welcome to episode 61of the FREE Audio PANCE and PANRE Physician Assistant Board Review Podcast. Join me as Icover ten PANCE and PANRE Board review questions from []Episode 63: The Audio PANCE and PANRE PA Board Review Podcast Ten MixedNCCPA PANCE Content Blueprint Multiple Choice Questions Welcome to episode 63of the FREE Audio PANCE and PANRE Physician Assistant Board Review Podcast. Join me as Icover ten PANCE and PANRE Board review questions from []Overview of the PANCE, PANRE and Pilot Alternative BlueprintsNew 2019 PANCE, PANRE and Pilot Alternative to PANRE blueprints. With a look at the new PANRE three-tier assessment system.

How to Say “Some” in Italian

How do you express a quantity that’s uncertain or approximate?  If you need to buy SOME  pane  and a BIT of  vino, here you will find an easy explanation on how to appropriately use larticolo partitivo in Italian.   The partitive article appears before singular nouns like  del miele, del caffà ¨, del burro (some honey, some coffee, some butter)  as well as before plural nouns of an unspecified amount  dei libri, delle ragazze, degli studenti (some books, some girls, some students).​   In the simplest terms, it can be defined as meaning some, but you may also use it to mean any or even a few when it is meant to be a rough estimate. The partitive is expressed by the Italian preposition di,  which typically means of or from, combined with the definite article, like il or le. For example: Lo ho delle cravatte blu.  Ã¢â‚¬â€œÃ‚  I have a few blue ties.Lei beve del caffà ¨. –  She is drinking some coffee.Lo esco con dei compagni. –  I go out with some friends.Lui vuole del burro. –  He would like some butter.Noi abbiamo soltanto della zuppa e un paio di cornetti. –  We only have some soup and a couple of croissants. Italian Partitive Articles   Singulare Plurale Femminile della delle Femminile (before a vowel) dell delle Maschile del dei Maschile (before a vowel) dell degli Maschile (before the letters z, x +consonant, and gn) dello degli A Little Bit Of: Un po’ Di However, using a form of the preposition di as the partitive article isn’t the only way to express an imprecise amount. You can also use the expression un po’ di, which translates to a bit of, a little bit of. For example: Vuoi un po’ di zucchero? –  Do you want a bit of sugar?Vorrei un po’ di vino rosso. –  I would like a little  bit of red wine.Aggiungi un po’ di sale e di pepe! –  Add a little bit of salt and pepper!Me ne sono andato perchà © volevo un po’ di pace. –  I left because I wanted a bit of peace.Avete dei cibi senza glutine? –  Do you have food without gluten?Mi serve un po’ d’acqua per favore? –  Could I have  a bit of water please? When to Use the Partitive Article Di vs. Un Po’ Di   Imagine this scenario. You walk into a panificio  because you need  del pane (some bread) and you tell the fornaio: Vorrei un po’ di pane toscano. –  I would like a bit of Tuscan bread. Do you see the difference there? Del pane is a more general way to say what you want, and you use un po di’ when you want to be more specific. Heres another example, lets think you are going to buy del basilico (some basil): Voglio comprare un po di basilico  Ã¢â‚¬â€œ I want to buy a bit of basil. For a richer, more organic use of the language, you could, instead of using a partitive article or the phrase un po’ di,  use an indefinite pronoun, and practice making sentences with alcuni (some), as in alcuni ragazzi  (some boys, a few boys) or qualche, as in qualche piatto (some dish).

The Victims Of The Victim - 864 Words

Victim Myths When people think about crime, they often try to side with either the victim or the perpetrator. In some crimes, victims are often blamed for the perpetrator’s actions. In these cases myths begin to develop and victims are labelled as the wrongdoers. A crime in specific in which there are many myths and stigmas associated to victims is rape. Many people believe that with rape the victims always attract rapist by the way they dress and behave. These factors are always incorrect because rape is a sexually violent act done to gain control and power over a victim. Myth One-Rape is Uncommon Many people are unaware of multiple cases of rape due to underreporting. The factors that causes underreporting is not uncommon and they affect victim’s willingness to report. â€Å"The NCVS does not stress privacy while conducting in-house interviews to gather its statistics on rape. This could prove problematic in instances where a family member is the abuser.† Majority of rape is done by someone well-known to the victim. This is so because the victims are easier to targets. â€Å"A major conflict between different surveys is the lack of a uniform definition of rape, specifically one that truly reflects the nature of sexual assault for all genders.† This is a problem because in many cases some acts that may have been a component of rape in one survey may not be considered as rape in another survey. (Thomas, 2013) Myth Two-Women Who Dress Revealing Intentionally Tease and Excite Men,Show MoreRelatedVictims Of The New Victims940 Words   |  4 PagesAs stated in Ministry of Justice (2013) press release victims of crime will receive more support than ever before to help bring offenders to justice and move on with their lives. The new Victims’ Code was set up explaining that people should expect from criminal justice agencies from the moment of reporting the crime to the end of trial. According to the Code victims of the most serious crimes, including hate crime, domestic violence, terrorism and sexual offences should get access to services likeRead MoreMale Victims Of Female Victims938 Words   |  4 PagesVICTIM BLAMING As stated above, one reason males being raped by females is not commonly known is because victims blame themselves. Male victims of rape, like female victims, are likely to be blamed by others for their own rape (Anderson, 2004). When victims blame themselves multiple questions run through their mind to where in the end they blame themselves for the action occurring and not want to tell anyone due to fear of embarrassment. Due to stereotypes, multiple studies have shown that maleRead MoreVictims, Crime, And Crime Victims1579 Words   |  7 PagesVictimology, or the study of victims, especially crime victims, has created new categories of victims that had not been previously noted. What are typically known as â€Å"street crimes†, such as rape, robbery, murder, and assault, have been identified as crimes since the biblical era, and the victims of such crimes have long been identifiable (Karmen, 2013). It has been the advances in the field of Victimology, and the questions whi ch have been asked, that have identified new types of crime, and withRead MoreThe Victims Of A Disaster Victim Identification1998 Words   |  8 Pagescoast of 13 nations, causing nearly 217,000 deaths and 125,000 injuries. Victim Identification was critical to prevent issues at cultural, humanitarian and legal levels for the surviving family members and friends. It could potentially risk living people and create mental problems for victim families until their loved ones are identified and brought home. I was part of the DVI (Disaster Victim Identification) team to identify victims, and based the process upon the international Interpol DVI guidelinesRead MoreThe Victims Of The Holocaust1467 Words   |  6 Pagescriminal.ï ¿ ½ In the holocaust, the Jews, in the eyes of Nazis, are a group of people that do not deserve moral consideration.ï ¿ ½ The Holocaust affected the lives of millions because of the hate inside of one certain group of people: the Nazi s.ï ¿ ½ The victims of th e Holocaust provide an excellent example of individuals who suffered from the torment of this psychological process as, for a variety of reasons, the Nazi s goal was to deprive human qualities such as individuality, compassion and most importantlyRead MoreBlaming the Victim1214 Words   |  5 PagesBlaming the Victim Sarah Schwartz Baker College Comp 101 Blaming the Victim 1 in 4 women will experience domestic violence in her lifetime (safehorizon.org). 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During the intervention of a victim, problem and therapeutic intervention will take place, exploring the client’s coping strategies, and referrals to human resourceRead More The Victims Essay1216 Words   |  5 PagesThe process of addressing memories of private suffering within â€Å"The Victims† by Sharon Olds is implied through contradictive perspectives. In the poem there is a shift in focus and tone during line 17. The poem addresses issues of suffering from two distinct perspectives, the first coming from a little girl and the second a grown woman. The narrative, imagery and diction are different in the two contrasting parts of the poem, and the second half carefully qualifies the first, as if to illustrateRead MoreLifeguard and Victim9071 Words   |  37 PagesChapter 5 Rescue Skills A lifeguard must always be prepared to enter the water to make rescues. After determining that the victim needs help, the lifeguard should assess the victim’s condition and use an appropriate rescue. The skills in this chapter can be used in most aquatic environments, although they may have to be modiï ¬ ed in some situations. 58 Lifeguarding GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR A WATER EMERGENCY 6. Provides emergency care as needed. Depending upon In all rescueRead MoreThe Victims Poem717 Words   |  3 PagesIn Sharon Olds’s poem The Victims, the speaker tells the multifaceted story of her abusive father and the subsequent estrangement of her family, while eventually likening her story to bums she sees sitting in filth and squalor. The speaker’s family withstood torment from the father all the while taking â€Å"it in silence† (2). In a nice twist, the father is divorced and humiliatingly grinned at by his own children when he loses his job, presumably becoming a bum after losing his income and family. The

The Philosophy Of Descartes Meditations - 1698 Words

Descartes Meditations is said to be the beginning of Western Philosophy. His writings are still greatly referred to to this day, and he is most famous for his quote â€Å"cogito ergo sum† which translates to â€Å"I think, therefore I am.† Each of Descartes’ meditations are followed by objections from other theologists and philosophers, and thereon followed by replies from Descartes. Some objections are made stronger than others, for example, Thomas Hobbes, and it could be doubted whether or not Descartes truly was able to successfully counter Hobbes’ objections. Hobbes wrote the third set of objections on all six of Descartes’ meditations, and in some cases making multiple objections within one meditation. Descartes’ first meditation concerns those things that can be called into doubt. It is in this mediation that Descartes relays all of which he previously believed in his life that could be false. He, in turn, decides that it would be best if he forgo all of his beliefs that could be false and begin again by starting with more certain bases. Descartes discusses his belief that though the senses are what we base our most certain knowledge on, the senses can be deceptive; for example, we sense things in dreams just as we do when we are awake. Hobbes objects to this meditation by saying if we leave out reason and only take into account our senses, then doubt is what follows; however, Plato had already come out with the idea of sensory deception as it applies to dreams, and so allShow MoreRelatedDescartes Meditations On First Philosophy807 Words   |  4 PagesConner Ruhl Professor Copley Philosophy 1000C 4 May 2015 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy Rene Descartes was the first great philosopher of the modern era, He had a new approach which was focused on scientific and mathematical truths. 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Cogito ergo sum or I think therefore I am, a phrase brought about by Descartes is the backbone of his whole philosophy of our existence in reality. As long as we are thinking things, we exist. When we look at this approach to our existence we must first deny that any sensoryRead MoreDescartes Meditations On First Philosophy1712 Words   |  7 PagesDescartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) contains six Meditations. In the first two of these Descartes addresses doubt and certainty. By the end of the second Meditation Descartes establishes the possibility of certainty by concluding that he is a â€Å"thinking thing† and that this is beyond doubt. Having established the possibility of certainty, Descartes attempts to prove the existence of God. The argument he presents in the Third Meditation for the existence of God has been nicknamed theRead MoreDescartes Meditation On First Philosophy943 Words   |  4 Pages In the third meditation of Descartes Meditation on First Philosophy, Descartes argues that his idea of God must have come from God himself. One can also wonder whether that very own argument could also apply when Descartes has an idea of the Evil Demon. In this paper, I will argue that Descartes would not think that his having an idea of the Evil Demon proves that the Evil Demon exists. In his paper, Descartes was trying to find the source of his idea of God in order to prove that GodRead MoreDescartes Meditations On First Philosophy1264 Words   |  6 PagesDescartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy is a first-person record of Descartes’ descent into the bowels of disbelief, in order to eradicate all flawed belief from his life. 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The First Meditation is where the â€Å"dreaming argument† is first mentioned and then gets resolved later in the Sixth Meditation and the Objections and Replies. I will be touching on the idea that our experiences could be dreaming experiences based on personal experiences and thoughts I have had regarding this topic. Then I will go on to explain how it is

The Issue Of Gun Control - 1418 Words

Jon Reichfield Mr. Thidemann U.S. Government 12R 6 October 2014 Gun control has been a controversial issue in America for over a half-century. This issue has two sides. On one side, there are people who oppose gun control and believe that it is their right under the second amendment to own one or more assault weapons. Republicans such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, Governor Rick Perry of Texas and Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina are against gun control. On the other side of the issue, there are people who favor gun control and believe that background checks should be given in order to keep these weapons out of the hands of people who are mentally ill. Democratic politicians such as House Majority Leader and Senator Harry Reid of†¦show more content†¦This law also required a person to register for a gun (Kim). Over the next thirty four years though, this issue worsened and more deaths occurred as a result of guns. These deaths included President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. As a result of these assass inations, The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed and later signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson. This act did not allow the sale of guns to drug users and the mentally ill, and it also required firearm dealers to get licenses and initiated interstate sale restrictions. The law also increased the age required in order to purchase a handgun to 21 (Kim). Not everybody was happy with this legislation though. The National Rifle Association, known as the NRA, founded in 1871, is a pro-gun organization that was unhappy with this act and with others. Once the Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed, the NRA opposed it. This caused the gun lobby to establish a new lobbying branch known as the NRA Institute for Legislative Action. The goal of this branch was to invalidate the 1968 law. In 1986, congress passed the Firearm Owner’s Protection Act which was later signed by President Ronald Reagan. This law limited the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms from inspecting gun dealers more th an once a year, with other inspections allowed only if multiple violations are found. An amendment also passed banning ownership of machine guns manufactured after May 19, 1986. Weapons made and

A European Way of War Free Essays

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM A EUROPEAN WAY OF WAR Steven Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael O’Hanlon about the CER The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to discuss the many social, political and economic challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world. We will write a custom essay sample on A European Way of War or any similar topic only for you Order Now The CER is pro-European but not uncritical. It regards European integration as largely bene? cial but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas for reforming the European Union. A European way of war ? Director: CHARLES GRANT ADVISORY BOARD PERCY BARNEVIK†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Chairman, AstraZeneca CARL BILDT†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. Former Swedish Prime Minister and Chairman, Nordic Venture Networks ANTONIO BORGES†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Former Dean of INSEAD NICK BUTLER (CHAIR)†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Group Vice President, Strategy, BP p. l. c. LORD DAHRENDORF †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Former Warden of St Antony’s College, Oxford EU Commissioner VERNON ELLIS†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. International Chairman, Accenture RICHARD HAASS†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. President, Council on Foreign Relations LORD HANNAY†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Former Ambassador to the UN and the EU IAN HARGREAVES†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â ‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Group Director of Corporate and Public Affairs, BAA plc LORD HASKINS OF SKIDBY†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Former Chairman, Northern Foods FRANCOIS HEISBOURG†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique CATHERINE KELLEHER†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Visiting Research Professor, US Naval War College SIR JOHN KERR†¦. Former Ambassador to the EU and US former Permanent Under Secretary, FCO FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA†¦.. Former President, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica RICHARD LAMBERT†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Former Editor, Financial Times DAVID MARSH†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. Partner, Droege Comp. AG DOMINIQUE MOISI†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Senior Advisor, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales JOHN MONKS†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ General Secretary, ETUC DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Chairman, QinetiQ p. l. c. WANDA RAPACZYNSKI†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. President of Management Board, Agora SA LORD SIMON O F HIGHBURY†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe PETER SUTHERLAND†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ Chairman, BP p. l. c. Goldman Sachs International ADAIR TURNER†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. Vice Chairman, Merrill Lynch Holdings Ltd. Steven Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael O’Hanlon Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 29 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QL Telephone + 44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile + 44 20 7233 1117, info@cer. org. uk, www. cer. org. uk  © CER MAY 2004 ? ISBN 1 901229 54 8 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Steven Everts is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, and director of its transatlantic programme. His recent CER publications include ‘Engaging Iran: a test case for EU foreign policy’ (March 2004); ‘The EU and the Middle East: a call for action’ (January 2003); and ‘Shaping a credible EU foreign policy’ (February 2002). Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies and vice principal (Research) at King’s College, London. He is the author of a number of books on Cold War history and contemporary security issues, most recently ‘Deterrence’ (Polity, 2004). He is also of? cial historian of the Falklands campaign. Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since 1998. He was previously defence editor and Brussels correspondent of The Economist. His most recent CER publication is ‘Transatlantic rift: how to bring the two sides together’ (July 2003). Francois Heisbourg is director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, and chairman of both the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also a member of the CER’s advisory board. Daniel Keohane is the research fellow for security and defence policy at the Centre for European Reform. He previously worked at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in Washington DC. He is the author of ‘The EU and armaments co-operation’ (CER December 2002). Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He previously worked for the US Congress. In his ten years at Brookings, he has written on US defence strategy and the defence budget, the Kosovo war, missile defence, military technology, space warfare and homeland security. AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank EDS for their support of this project. They also owe particular thanks to Kate Meakins for designing this publication, and to Aurore Wanlin and John Springford for their research help. In addition, the CER is grateful to the German Marshall Fund of the US for supporting the CER’s transatlantic programme. Charles Grant would like to thank the following for their help: Victoria Billing, Gavin Cook, Marta Dassu, Paul Johnston, Edwina Moreton and Simon Webb. ? Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and noncommercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform. Contents About the authors Authors’ acknowledgements Foreword 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane 2 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman 3 The ‘European Security Strategy’ is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg 4 The American way of war: the lessons for Europe Michael O’Hanlon 5 Conclusion: the signi? ance of European defence Charles Grant 55 41 27 13 1 Foreword EDS has worked for many years in partnership with the ministries of defence and the armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic. We currently have colleagues stationed in the Middle East, in support of UK forces. We are, therefore, delighted to be supporting this new CER work, ‘A European way of war’. In t he best traditions of the CER, it has brought together key experts from both sides of the Atlantic to debate the future of European defence. What is striking about the contributions is the high level of agreement on what Europe needs to do. They avoid the stereotyping of the US-Europe relationship as a division of labour in which – as Francois Heisbourg says – the US ‘kicks in doors’ and the EU ‘cleans the house’. All agree that Europe must urgently improve its military capabilities if it is to translate the goal of â€Å"effective multilateralism† from rhetoric into reality. It must reduce the scale of its land armies and the number of duplicate equipment programmes. Europe must begin investing in technologies and equipment that complement rather than duplicate US investment. Equally, the authors highlight the lessons and experiences which Europe can offer to the US in he prosecution of unconventional warfare, for example in deterring insurgents and terrorists. These essays provide a timely reminder of how the US and Europe are united by a common need to tackle global terrorism and proliferation, as well as their underlying causes. They all agree on the need for Europe to become a more effective military power and to take more responsibility for its own backyard. But they debunk some of the myths associated with the debate. All agree that Europe need not spend as much as the US or copy America’s force structure and doctrine in every respect. As Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane stress, a European way of war does not mean either the creation of â€Å"an EU army under Brussels control, or the end of the NATO military alliance†. This work is a valuable contribution to the current debate on the future of European defence. Its prescriptions on how Europe can play an effective military role in world affairs deserve to be taken up by Europe’s leaders. Graham Lay Managing Director EDS Defence 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane The idea of a ‘European way of war’ is controversial. Many defence commentators and of? ials assume that the phrase is a metaphor for two, equally undesirable, outcomes: an EU army under the control of Brussels and the end of NATO. The reality is that the EU will not have its own army for decades to come – if ever. Nor will NATO’s status as Europe’s pre-eminent defence organisation change any time soon. Most discussions on the future of European d efence, when cast in such terms, generate more heat than light. There is, however, a real need for Europeans to think more creatively about what kind of defence capability they want. What sorts of missions do they envisage? And how do they expect their forces to operate in the future? European governments need to make a tough assessment of the additional tasks they want their armies to perform, alongside traditional peacekeeping. Clearly, Europe cannot hope to copy the American approach to warfare, with its heavy emphasis on technology and ‘full spectrum dominance’ – the ability to defeat any enemy in every conceivable category of weaponry. The budgetary constraints are simply too great. But equally, the Europeans should not try to emulate the Americans’ doctrine or force structure in their entirety – even if they had unlimited money – because Europe has very different trategic priorities. For a range of historical and political reasons, Europeans do not share all of America’s security policy goals. And yet American doctrine, tactics and capabilities remain the benchmark for nearly all European discussions on defence policy. 2 A European way of war Introduction 3 Such constant, and mostly unfavourable, comparisons wi th the US tend to create a harmful sense of impotence and resignation among European defence of? cials. The European countries have very disparate military traditions, and they have great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment. Despite these problems, can European governments develop more innovative and ambitious defence policies? The answer is yes, but only if European defence ministries develop their own distinctive approach to warfare. European Council, Brussels, ‘A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy’, December 12th 2003. 1 warfare: peacekeeping, nation-building and counter-insurgency. Thus the Pentagon could learn a lot from European experiences and ways of operating. Our American contributor, Michael O’Hanlon, argues that the Pentagon is already learning fast from its post-con? ct experience in Iraq. He stresses that stabilisation missions should not be seen as less important than those involving high-intensity warfare. And he argues that the greatest threat to the health of the US military in the coming years is insuf? cient numbers of troops to help with nationbuilding. He adds that the dif? culties that US troops face when working with technologic ally backward European allies are a serious but secondary problem. Freedman and O’Hanlon agree that both American and European armed forces need a better mixture of regular warfighting capabilities and peacekeeping skills. But politicians in Europe should take note – and take heart – that such improvements need not mean massive increases in defence budgets. The 2 Based on estimates governments of the EU-25 collectively spend in the SIPRI Yearbook approximately S180 billion ($220 billion) a year on 2003, ‘Armaments, defence, which is a signi? cant amount of money. 2 disarmaments and For all its weaknesses, the EU remains the world’s international security’, Oxford University second highest spender after the US, which devotes Press, Oxford, 2003. some S330 billion ($400 billion) to defence. O’Hanlon recommends that over the next decade EU governments should spend 10 per cent of their annual defence budgets on speci? c types of equipment. These include long-range transport planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided missiles. To pay for this, he argues, defence ministries should cut their manpower by a quarter, and focus on developing highly trained combat troops. If defence ministries followed this plan, by 2015 Europe would have more than 200,000 high-quality, professional soldiers, able to operate at short notice anywhere around the globe. At the moment the US can send about 400,000 ground troops The European security strategy, prepared by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, provides a good basis for thinking about a European approach to warfare. 1 But, as Francois Heisbourg points out in this pamphlet, that security strategy contains some glaring gaps. He argues that the EU should do three things in particular: draw up a complementary strategy for the EU’s internal security; audit the impact of European development programmes on security in recipient countries; and start working on an EU military doctrine. In his essay, Lawrence Freedman questions the utility of an EU military doctrine, and concludes that it would be redundant. He thinks it unlikely that 25 European governments could ever agree on a meaningful doctrine. But Britain and France could take the lead, he argues, in de? ning a distinctly ‘European’ military contribution to dealing with global security problems. London and Paris are the only European capitals that have run their own military operations in recent years, sometimes in very demanding environments. And, unlike the other Europeans, the French and the British already have highly developed military doctrines of their own. Freedman also argues that, even though the US is the world’s predominant military power, European soldiers are often better than American ones at many of the missions that dominate contemporary 4 A European way of war 5 around the world, out of a total of about 650,000. But presently the EU-25 can barely deploy 85,000, out of a total of 1. 2 million ground soldiers. 3 From both a defence planner’s point of view, and that of the taxpayer, Europe’s armies need 3 These ? ures do not include air force or urgent reform. navy personnel. The total number of the US armed forces is approximately 1. 4 million people. The 25 EU governments have almost 2 million people in their total armed forces. Figures based on estimates in the ‘The Military Balance 2003-2004’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004. Recent development s in Brussels Heisbourg, Freedman and O’Hanlon all agree that in principle a European approach to warfare is a good idea, provided three basic conditions are met: ? Europe’s two pre-eminent military powers, Britain and France, must take the lead in de? ning a European approach to war. Some EU governments may balk at having to follow an approach that would be de? ned to a large extent by British and French doctrine. However, Europe is better off with a sound military doctrine than a meaningless political compromise. In their approach to warfare, Europeans should learn from the US approach, and from American experiences in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. European armies should be able to work well with American soldiers. However, Europe’s armies do not have to copy US forces in every respect. European defence ministries need to retain their traditional peacekeeping skills, while simultaneously building up their war-fighting prowess. The EU needs to develop the internal aspects of its security and defence policy. In particular, European governments have to think about how to join up the various policy instruments which they need in the fight against global terrorism. EU governments need to ensure that their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies work together more effectively. The good news is that NATO and the EU are already taking steps that will help their members to develop a European approach to warfare. At NATO’s 2002 Prague summit, President Bush called on the Europeans to increase their military might by creating a NATO Response Force (NRF). European governments followed his lead, approving a plan for a force of 21,000 elite troops, backed by supporting air and sea components, to be ready by 2006. This force will enable NATO to engage in a serious shooting war, in addition to its current peacekeeping work. By the end of 2003, NATO governments had already committed 9,000 troops to the response force, including 1,700 French soldiers. The NRF will be mainly European: the US accounts for only 300 (3 per cent) of the troops so far committed. 4 Washington’s message to its allies has been clear: Europe must increase its ability to undertake tough war-? ghting tasks if NATO is to remain central to US defence policy. NATO’s Response Force is goading the Europeans to prepare some of their troops for the most demanding types of military mission. 4 Spain is the biggest contributor to the NRF, with 2,200 troops. Germany is contributing 1,100 soldiers. See Luke Hill, ‘Alliance launches triservice rapid Response Force’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 22nd 2003. ? ? In February 2004, the British, French and German governments proposed that the EU should be able to deploy nine ‘battle groups’, each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable within two weeks. Each battle group would be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets, including transport and logistical support. The rationale for these EU combat units is to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN usually manages to ? d peacekeepers who can police a cease? re or peace accord. But it often cannot ? nd troops available to form an intervention force. It needs to be able to draw on a few battalions which are ready and able to ? y into a con? ict zone and impose peace. For example, the UN was unable to intervene quickly enough in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is unlikely to provide the UN with US forces for this kind of task. Currently the United States has only two 6 A European way of war Introduction 7 See http://www. un. org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/ contributors/Countries SummaryFeb2004. df. 5 soldiers involved in UN-run peacekeeping operations (out of a total of 42,000 soldiers, of which 3,650 are from the EU-25). 5 If the US is unwilling to provide peacekeepers, it is even less likely to make elite forces available for UN interventions. But the EU could be willing to help the UN: countries such as Britain and France have highly trained forces which can move into a war-zone at short notice. And European governments care much more than the US does about the UN’s ability to act in geographical areas that may not be of fundamental strategic importance. This is why the EU sent a small UN-mandated intervention force to Bunia in Congo in June 2003. And in April 2004 the EU considered the possibility of sending a UN-backed intervention force to the Dafur region of Sudan, where more than 650,000 people had ? ed killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. EU defence ministers agreed to the battle group initiative at their meeting in April 2004. They now have until 2007 to establish these forces – and may do so in three ways. First, a government could put together a national battle group. Only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own combat units. Second, relatively large countries – such as Sweden and the Netherlands – could become lead or ‘framework’ nations for a battle group. Smaller countries would then supply some troops or equipment to plug gaps that the lead country could not ? ll. The third option would be for several countries to come together to form truly multinational units, similar to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, which unites soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. For a smaller country which does not want to ‘plug into’ a particular lead nation, a multinational unit might be politically more appealing. For example, the Nordic and Baltic countries could decide to form a Baltic battle group. But multinational battle groups need not be regional. The EU’s non-aligned countries, for example, might want to form their own. Austria, Finland and Ireland are of similar military strength, and they could ? nd that co-operating with fellow neutrals rather than NATO members would avoid embarrassing questions regarding their neutral status. In any case the creation of these battle groups – like the NATO Response Force – should help Europeans to think more alike on how they conduct warfare. Moreover, this effort should reinforce NATO’s Response Force: the same troops would be available to the EU and NATO. During the summer of 2004, they EU will set up a new agency. The ‘defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments agency’ will try to do two things, both of which will help the Europeans to develop a common approach to defence. It will seek to improve European military capabilities and to enhance armaments co-operation among the member-states. Unlike a typical national armaments agency, this new body will not have a procurement budget. So a better short description would be to call it a ‘capabilities agency’, since it will bring together the separate worlds of research, development and procurement. The agency’s most important role will be political, in assessing member-states’ progress towards meeting their capability commitments. Over the last few years, the Europeans’ progress towards modernising and re-equipping their armies has been painfully slow. In 2002, EU governments agreed to a ‘European capabilities action plan’ (ECAP), which committed them to acquiring various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes and precision-guided missiles. The agency will evaluate and report annually on the member-states’ progress towards meeting these commitments. At present, the agency looks set to keep these reports confidential. That would be a shame. If those reports were made public, the agency could ‘name and shame’ the member-states which renege on pledges, and thus put them under pressure to deliver. 8 A European way of war Introduction 9 Finally, European governments are due to reach agreement on an EU constitution in June 2004. This will probably include articles on ‘structured co-operation’, EU jargon for a process that allows a small group of member-states to move forward in the area of defence. Given that EU countries have, and will always have, very different military capabilities, closer co-operation amongst a smaller group makes sense. Quite apart from the much-documented transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities gulf between EU member-states – a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in May 2004. A revised version of the draft protocol listing the criteria for joining ‘structured co-operation’ can be found at http://ue. eu. int/igcpdf/en/03/c g00/cg00057-re01. en03. pdf. – and demanding nature – of future missions. The EU undertook its ? rst military missions in Macedonia and Congo in 2003. These experiences have already helped def ence ministries to understand which kinds of equipment they need most urgently, and what types of skills their troops should develop. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO: this mission will be extremely dif? ult, including, for example, the hunt for the indicted Bosnian Serb general, Radovan Karadzic. Much more than the Congo or Macedonia operations, Bosnia will be a crucial test of the EU’s military mettle. The enlargement of the EU brings it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern, south-eastern and southern ? anks. Romania and Bulgaria are hoping to join the EU in 2007, while Turkey, Croatia and other countries of the Western Balkans are likely to enter at a later stage. The EU will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its borders. It is bound to become more involved in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Across the Atlantic, US priorities will remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and con? icts such as China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. Washington will be reluctant to become too involved in con? icts around the EU’s eastern and southern borders. The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie between the Union and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue. But EU strategy towards its nearabroad will also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US to put out ? res in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo in 1998 – which begat the European Security and Defence Policy – was to improve the EU’s poor performance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The EU’s efforts to tackle con? icts in its near abroad may require more than ‘mere’ peacekeeping. For example, if the delicate That said, the current wording of the draft constitution sets targets for participation in the avant-garde which are relatively easy to meet. For example, the draft says that one of the criteria for participation is to supply by 2007 all or part of a combat unit that can be deployed in between ? ve and thirty days. 6 In fact, these combat units are the same types of force as those envisaged in the ‘battle groups’ plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004. However, some member-states will probably stay out of the structured co-operation, because they lack the assets or the ambition to take part. The defence inner circle will in some respects resemble the eurozone: some countries remain outside because they do not satisfy the criteria, and others because they choose to do so. Structured co-operation will help the emergence of a European approach to warfare: like the NRF and the battle groups, the concept encourages other countries to emulate what the British and French armed forces do. The transatlantic case for a European way of war Innovations such as the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should, together with some institutional innovations, enhance Europe’s military clout. But probably the most important factor driving military reform in Europe will be the growing number 10 A European way of war Introduction 11 situation in Kosovo turned into a civil war, the EU should be ready to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In such situations, British soldiers would be fighting alongside those from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with American troops. If the Europeans were able to undertake that kind of robust military intervention autonomously, transatlantic relations would benefit. For the Pentagon would have one less region to worry about. Furthermore, the more effective the Europeans’ military prowess, the more likely is the US to use NATO not only for peacekeeping but also for high-intensity interventions. The future of EU defence policy All the authors of this pamphlet are worried about the risk of a transatlantic division of labour – namely the idea that Europe should do the peacekeeping and America ? ght the wars. But they all reject that notion, both as a description of the present and as a prescription for the future. The experience of Iraq has already forced the US to rethink its approach to post-con? ict operations. Having sometimes sneered at them, the Pentagon is now learning that peacekeeping, nation-building, and counter-insurgency should play a larger role in its military doctrine. Meanwhile, as the EU takes on more military missions, its defence ministries are themselves engaged in a learning process. They are starting to see that they will need more sophisticated equipment, and be prepared for serious combat missions. They know that they will not always be able to count on the US to do the war-? ghting for them. It is true that the US and Europe currently have very different doctrines and priorities. But experiences on the ground will probably encourage both sides to address their respective weaknesses: post-con? ict stabilisation for the US and war-? ghting for the Europeans. In the long run this may lead – to some extent – to doctrinal convergence. European soldiers already conduct peacekeeping operations very differently from American troops. They expend less effort on force protection, they fraternise more with locals and they are more reluctant to unleash ? re-power. Europeans will also, inevitably, fight their wars differently from the Americans. Given their budgetary constraints, European defence ministries have no choice but to focus less than the Pentagon does on sophisticated technology and airpower, and more on the role of ground forces. But these differences of emphasis should not prevent the Europeans from defeating most of their prospective enemies. When the EU mounts an autonomous combat operation, it is likely to be against a small or medium-sized power with weak air defences. The Europeans do not plan to ? ght any large and wellequipped adversaries on their own. In such cases, European soldiers would ? ght alongside American troops. Finally, the rapid evolution of EU internal security policy will affect defence policy. The March 2004 bombings in Madrid con? rmed the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorist groups to strike at Europe. In order to track these groups, EU governments will have to piece together information from a variety of sources. They have pledged to step up intelligence-sharing, and in March 2004 they appointed Gijs de Vries as the Union’s ? rst anti-terrorism ‘tsar’. Since the terrorist threat comes from both within and outside the EU, the member-states can no longer afford to maintain 7 See Daniel Keohane the traditional distinction etween external and and Adam Townsend, internal security. 7 In the most extreme cases, EU ‘A joined-up EU security policy’, CER countries may wish to deploy force against a Bulletin, December terrorist group that is based abroad, or against a 2003 – January 2004. state that harbours terrorists. European defence policy is developin g fast – and a more distinctive European approach to warfare is bound to emerge in coming years. However, such an approach is – paradoxically – more likely to develop in NATO than in the EU itself. For most European defence ministries, NATO will continue to be the principal multinational 2 A European way of war military organisation. That is not only because NATO is a military alliance – which the EU is not – but also because of NATO’s large and experienced military headquarters. More than 2,000 people work at NATO’s strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe – known as SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, while the EU military staff in Brussels has fewer than 200 people. Moreover, NATO has regional command headquarters in Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (the Netherlands), as well as a ‘transformation’ headquarters in Norfolk (US), which focuses speci? ally on reforming NATO’s armies. Put simply, Euro pean armies are reforming principally because of their collaboration in NATO, rather than the EU. The best example of this reform process is the NATO Response Force. Britain, France, Spain and Germany are See Kori Schake, leading the European contribution to this force, ‘Constructive duplication: reducing EU reliance on US while American participation is only symbolic. military assets’, CER, Thus NATO is playing its part in promoting a January 2002. She proposed more ambitious but distinctly ‘European way that the Europeans develop of war’. The irony is that the NATO Response a ‘strike force’, similar to Force was an American idea, which the the NATO Response Force Europeans have enthusiastically embraced. 8 that governments agreed to 8 2 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine which would de? ne the procedures to guide armed forces in future con? icts? EU governments have very different military strengths and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. Those differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional military doctrine, if it tried to create one. However, either acting together or separately, EU armies could make a distinctively ‘European’ contribution to contemporary military operations. Britain and France should take the lead in de? ning that contribution. Their armed forces are the most capable and experienced in Europe, and have therefore had the opportunity to develop military doctrines that have been tested in the most dangerous types of operation. Any European military effort has to be compared with American military power. The US is in an unassailable position for winning conventional wars, as it did in Iraq in the spring of 2003. However, the problem of insurgents in Iraq has illustrated the extent to which the US has a dysfunctional military doctrine for unconventional warfare. Europeans should therefore not be obsessed with matching US military prowess. Europe’s conventional capabilities should be suf? cient to cope with most prospective con? icts, especially since the cases where they might ? ght wars without the Americans would be rare. Unconventional warfare has become the most signi? cant and demanding form of military operation, and in this area the Americans have a lot to learn from the Europeans. et up in November 2002. In the coming years, European governments should strengthen their military clout and conduct more ambitious autonomous military operations. But they should also improve the ability of their soldiers to work alongside Americans. As NATO evolves and reforms, the EU’s security and defence policy will reap the bene? ts. Those who see the ESDP and NATO as competing and mutual ly exclusive concepts – and there are a few such people, in some parts of the Pentagon and the French foreign ministry – are living in the past. NATO and EU defence policy will sink or swim together, and on current trends they will swim. 14 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 15 An EU military doctrine would be dysfunctional Countries often develop reputations for conducting their military campaigns in accordance with their national character. On this basis, northern Europeans would be cool and calculating, and southern Europeans romantic and impetuous, while the British would be pragmatic and stubborn. In practice, however, geo-strategic considerations are the biggest in? uence on national military doctrines. A cursory glance at 20th century military campaigns backs up this point. In the 1960s, the Israelis knew they had to seize the initiative against Egypt, Jordan and Syria by striking ? rst; if they had waited until they were attacked they would have been swamped. In the 1940s, the Russians could depend on territorial space and population mass to defend against the invading German army, while the Germans wanted to make the most of their qualitative advantages – such as their superior equipment – before the quantitative disadvantages began to tell. For maritime powers such as Britain and the US, the natural instinct has been to project sea and air power from a distance, and to rely on allies to carry out the bulk of land warfare. To be relevant and effective, a military doctrine should draw on a view of the world and its problems; make assessments of available military capabilities (including those of allies and enemies); and add precise ideas about strategy and tactics for the armed forces to follow. Thus, a doctrine should provide a framework in which armed forces can train, plan, conduct exercises, and generally work together in a mutually reinforcing way. The best doctrines orientate armed forces for the future, so that soldiers recognise the situations in which they will find themselves and know how to act. A commander’s orders should be clear and well understood by his or her soldiers. By the same token, bad doctrine will lead to surprises and disorientation. In the worst circumstances, major adaptations to the organisation of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations will be required, even in the midst of a war going badly. A doctrine emanates rom a political process, involving ministries, agencies, and armed services – so any doctrinal changes will require negotiation between those disparate groups. Military doctrine, therefore, reflects the preferences of powerful voices within government and the armed forces, as well as the concerns of key allies. One consequence of a complex political process involving a range of competing interests may be a dysfunctional doctrine. The risk of dysfunction grows durin g a prolonged period of peace, which tends to spare doctrine from critical scrutiny. Only regular experience with combat and the ultimate empirical test of war provide defence ministries with constant reality checks. The risk of a dysfunctional EU doctrine is high, mainly because it would require 25 governments and their respective defence establishments to compromise. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity – and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an actual conflict. Furthermore, European governments have not yet developed a very successful EU foreign policy. And such a foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. No European soldiers will be deployed on EU military missions if the Union’s governments cannot agree on their political objectives. The impact of having several governments negotiate strategy documents, whether in the EU or NATO, is to render those documents more bland and vague. The European Security Strategy, which EU leaders approved in December 2003, illustrates that point (see Francois Heisbourg’s chapter). Furthermore, these political processes have become even more complicated with the arrival of ten new EU members in May 2004. Both the EU and NATO are becoming increasingly unwieldy and less able to act swiftly and resolutely in a crisis. But NATO has more chance of acting decisively, because of US leadership and the absence of the more paci? st EU neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden). In addition, most EU member-states have only limited experience of war-? ghting. With the exception of France, the enthusiasm in some 16 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 17 capitals for the ‘Europeanisation’ of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to use military force. Belgium is the most conspicuous example of this tendency. Only Britain and France have recently had substantial military experience. Only London and Paris have had to think about the demands of high-octane missions. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the Ivory Coast in 2002. Other EU member-states have participated in coalition wars or in peacekeeping operations – which have sometimes been quite bruising experiences. And many EU governments are making substantial contributions to operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But a serious military doctrine should not only re? ect combat experience but also command experience. Countries like Germany and Spain are going through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain limited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops. Much contemporary warfare is against opponents which do not represent a direct existential threat, as did the Soviet Union, but rather cause chaos in the more fragile parts of the world. There may be a variety of reasons why one EU government might feel obliged to get involved in a con? ict (such as lingering post-colonial ties), but equally many reasons why others might not. At present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use military force. There is, therefore, a risk that even if the EU had a military doctrine, re? cting the partial views and meagre capabilities of most of its member-states, the governments would not agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct future EU operations. For some countries, like France and Austria, an EU brand might legitimise a military doctrine and future operations; but for others, such as Denmark and some of the new EU members, it could have the opposite effect. For all these reasons, any attempt to turn the EU into a proper military organisation with a shared doctrine is bound to end in failure. However, a European approach to warfare does not have to be an EU approach. Instead, Europe could develop a ‘way of war’ that builds on the experience of the major European military powers, namely Britain and France. There is something distinctive about the demanding nature of their past experiences and present contributions which could be a model for the rest of Europe. Furthermore, those European countries that have actively participated in recent operations, such as Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, also share this distinctive approach, at least to some degree. Most wars are now fought by ‘coalitions of the willing’. International institutions – the United Nations, NATO or the EU – endow a degree of legitimacy on such coalitions, but do not run major wars themselves. The NATO management of the 1999 Kosovo war may be the exception that proves the rule. The real question is which governments are ready to join a coalition to address a particular emergency. A key aspect of the answer to that question is the likely role that the US would play in leading such coalitions. American military doctrine is dysfunctional US military doctrine has become increasingly dysfunctional. The principal reason is the changed nature of modern warfare, rather than the convoluted political process in Washington. European commentators often make the mistake of comparing de? ciencies in their own decision-making procedures to the complex and often acrimonious inter-agency process in Washington. The delays and confusion that the Washington process can cause are often serious. But there is an important difference with Europe: in the US there is a single decision-maker – the president – who serves as the ? nal arbiter. All US armed services – Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines – have developed their own doctrines, often with scant regard for each 18 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 19 other. Nevertheless, ever since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, an underlying assumption has given coherence and continuity to American military thinking. The fundamental assumption guiding the Pentagon is that US armed forces should prepare for wars against other major powers. All other types of operation are secondary ones which America should, if at all possible, avoid. From this assumption ? ws the reason that American doctrine has become dysfunctional: straightforward conventional wars against major powers are becoming a rarity, while complicated small wars are becoming more common. There are two specific reasons behind the failure of existing American doctrine. First, the energy and resources which the Pentagon devotes to conventional forces have reach ed a point of diminishing marginal returns. Second, the Pentagon has spent too little effort on training soldiers for those unconventional operations that it dismissed as non-core business, but which are increasingly dominating America’s military efforts. The recent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that: ? ? ? with increasing accuracy. This means that the network of overseas bases which the US established in Europe during the Cold War is becoming redundant. As a consequence, allies are often considered to be something of a nuisance, demanding major political inputs in return for minor military outputs. Donald 9 US Department of Defense Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, has News Brie? ng in Warsaw with observed that in the current era the mission Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 25th 2002. hould determine the coalition, rather than the other way around. 9 NATO’s Kosovo war did much to shape America’s attitudes towards its allies. NATO tried to achieve its objectives through an air campaign, which led to an exaggerated perception of the disparity between American and European military capabilities. Europeans could barely muster 15 per cent of the total air sorties. But to the intense irr itation of the Americans, this gap did not stop the Europeans from demanding a big say over the selection of targets and the overall course of the war. The largest transatlantic row occurred when the British overnment pushed for a commitment to use ground troops if the air campaign continued to fail to produce results. The Clinton administration was deeply reluctant to pay a domestic political price for such a land campaign. It feared that US public opinion would be unwilling to tolerate even modest casualties for what would be seen as marginal foreign policy objectives. Only Britain’s promise to commit up to 50,000 troops to an eventual land operation began to ease US objections. conventional victories are relatively easy to accomplish; the West can easily achieve air dominance; and the key military tests are increasingly found on the ground. In terms of conventional warfare, the US is now in a class of its own. This is hardly surprising since the US defence budget is equivalent to what the rest of the world spends collectively on defence. America also spends its defence money far more ef? ciently than European governments do. Even so, to occupy a country the size of Iraq with effectively only three combat divisions (each with between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers), as the US did in April 2003, is remarkable. Furthermore, recent advances in defence technology have allowed American commanders to project lethal power over great distances EU defence: too much process, not enough output Transatlantic arguments over the Kosovo campaign had a major impact on European attitudes towards a common defence policy. By the end of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, European leaders were concerned about the United States’ limited commitment to resolving European con? icts. On the eve of the Kosovo war, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac held a summit at St Malo. They identi? ed a way 20 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 21 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, ‘Europe’s military revolution’, CER, 2001. 10 orward for European defence and the Kosovo war initially accelerated that process. 10 However, FrancoBritish momentum was soon lost, and subsequent events – in particular the quarrels over Iraq – have highlighted once again the differences of view between Paris and London. The core issue in Europe’s defence debates is what relat ionship Europe should have with the US. To simplify somewhat – but not excessively – the French believe Europe must raise its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views. In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is necessary to gain an entree into Washington’s decisionmaking processes. France, however, has fluctuated between its readiness to embrace an alliance with the US and its desire to develop alternatives. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to propose a mission for Europe as a whole. The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. But the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks forlorn unless Britain, Europe’s only other serious military power, collaborates with France. For both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress – either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the foundations for an alternative to NATO. The St Malo compromise also shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises – although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATO’s planning and command capabilities. The Iraq row has not been fatal to the European defence initiative. A more serious problem for the EU is that its defence policy will lack substance without extra military capabilities – and these have yet to materialise. European countries cannot move 11 Seven European substantial forces with speed to anywhere governments are buying outside Europe. Only Britain has any serious, if 180 A-400M transport modest, transport capability – while Germany planes but these are short had to use Ukrainian aircraft to carry its troops range rather than long range. Only the UK has to Afghanistan. Some improvements are in long range transport planes train, albeit painfully slowly. For example, the that can carry the ? rst of the A400M transport planes should be heaviest loads. delivered in 2009. 1 These limitations do not make Europe-only operations impossible. But EU missions are either going to be small, and in effect Britishled and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to rely upon American support, as they do in the Balkans. At the moment, EU defence policy gives the impression of being yet another European initiative bogged down in endless and largely pointless wrangles about process. To sceptics, th e defence debates in Brussels have little to do with preparing for warfare, and more to do with reviving a ? agging European political project. This explains why the key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels, rather than defence ministries buying new equipment. This general preoccupation in European capitals with form rather than content was evident in the debate over planning cells in 2003. In April of that year, France and Germany (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) proposed a European planning cell that would operate separately from NATO’s command structures – to the intense annoyance of Europe’s Atlanticist countries such as Britain. 22 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 23 In December 2003, EU governments agreed that the EU would deploy a small group of operational planners to SHAPE, NATO’s planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work on ensuring a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on ‘Berlin-plus’ missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about 30 operational planners for the EU’s military staff, which currently consists mainly of ‘strategic planners’ (their job is to advise EU foreign ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national military headquarters). The new unit will help with the planning of EU military and civilian missions which involve policemen. Given that there are very few places where Europeans could even think of acting militarily without a benign US attitude, and probably American logistical and intelligence support, the point of the Franco-German proposal was unclear. The fact that such proposals irritate Washington may be a bonus for some in Paris and Berlin, but it also strengthens the perception that the purpose of European defence policy has little to do with how armed forces might actually be used. articipated in operations abroad. Germany is an interesting example of this reform process. At the end of 2003 the German government decided to shift the focus of its defence planning from territorial defence towards acting overseas. By 2010 Germany will have a 35,000-strong ‘intervention’ force for combat operations and a 70,000-strong ‘stabilisation’ force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are – sensibly – getting rid of large stocks of weapons designed for con? icts that are now unlikely to materialise. There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can deliver only ‘dumb’ bombs. The question of how European armies should work with American forces is crucial for the development of a European approach to warfare. But the terms of the Europeans’ defence debate need to change. In particular they need to get away from taking American military prowess as the standard by which all others are judged. There are three reasons for this. First, there are very few contingencies in which the Europeans could contemplate ? hting a major war without the US. The most serious military scenarios would be in Asia – such as a future con? ict involving China. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that European governments would act independently of the US. Moreover, when the Europeans did work with the Americans in a conventional war, the added value would be largely political rather than military. Second, comparing European milit ary power with the US is both misleading and irrelevant. The massive American defence effort sets an impossible standard for Europeans to meet. European governments should not try to match the extravagant US force structure. Nevertheless, Europeans do need to fulfil their past promises to improve military capabilities, so that they they are not caught short in some future emergency. Crucially, this does not require a large additional financial commitment from European governments. The way forward for European defence Any attempt by governments to draw up an EU military doctrine would be fraught and probably futile. Instead, Britain and France should lead Europe in developing a European approach to warfare that is based on their recent campaigns. Other European states would have to be involved in that process, and be prepared to contribute. In many respects, British and French doctrine is already quite mature and well geared for contemporary international conditions, especially when the task involves irregular war in weak or failing states. The British operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French mission to the Ivory Coast in 2002 are examples of the types of operation which the EU can expect to undertake in the near future. Furthermore, British and French doctrine has already had a significant influence on those other EU countries that have 4 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 25 Furthermore, there is not going to be a transatlantic war, and the Europeans and Americans need to be able to work together. The surge in American military technology does create new problems for Europeans trying to work alongside American soldiers on the ground. However, European governments should aim to d evelop armies that complement the US armed forces rather than copy them. Europeans will only act alone in those contingencies where the Americans do not see much of a role for themselves. Europeans cannot work directly against the Americans, or even take action in the face of deep American objections – though the Americans can act against European objections. Unless a well-armed rogue state emerges near Europe, such as a nuclear-armed Iran, the most likely opponents of the EU will be in Africa or the Middle East and will have weak air defences. Such opponents would not be a serious match for European forces, especially if the Americans were assisting with logistics and intelligence. It is true that the Europeans could not have fought the Kosovo war without the US, at least not in the way the Americans fought it. But European governments could have fought that war differently, with a greater stress from the start on preparations for a land war. A modest number of high quality aircraft, especially in combination with welltrained professional forces, can be extremely effective. For example, during the 1980s the Iranians spent six years outside Basra, unable to make headway against the Iraqi defences. In 2003, the British spent about eight days in that position. The conclusion is clear: Europeans do not have to ? ght as Americans. Even if they wanted to, it would be totally beyond their capabilities. But more importantly, in many contemporary con? icts they are better off ? ghting the European way. The third reason for not trying to copy the US is the dysfunctional nature of American military doctrine. Contemporary American doctrine focuses on ‘big threats’ and prepares US armed forces for capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive wars. But the conventional war stage of a conflict is shrinking, while the unconventional war stage which follows is expanding. Examples of this phenomenon are high-intensity policing in the Balkans, peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. Impressive US strides in conventional warfare are due to American cultural impatience; a political preference for quick results and technology-based solutions; and the Pentagon’s desire to use maximum resources to keep casualties to a minimum. Irregular warfare requires more patience and puts greater pressures on frontline troops and junior of? cers. Soldiers also have to co-ordinate their efforts with aid workers and diplomats, as well as quell social unrest. In these cases, the enemy understands that it will be overwhelmed in regular war. But, with a determination ? ed by nationalism, ethnic vulnerability or ideology, the enemy can embarrass the Americans by adopting traditional insurgent tactics. Iraq is a particularly challenging example, for very speci? c historical reasons. The Iraq experience is posing the biggest test to American military prowess since Vietnam – although it is not of the same proportions. The Americans have suffered heavily from a ? xation with force protection, which often leads to over-reaction by soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together. A comparison between the American counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad and the British one in Basra in 2003-04 ? tters the British, because of the much more favourable political climate in southern Iraq. Nonetheless, it reinforces the view that the British have a better approach to this sort of campaign, in particular by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population. It is fair to say that Europeans are more skilled at this sort of campaign, in part because of the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping. Because today’s opponents are more likely to specialise in guerrilla warfare than tanks and aircraft, there is now a paradoxical situation. 6 A European way of war The United States’ reluctance to engage in unconventional wars has constrained its surplu s of power. Both the Clinton and, initially, the Bush administrations sought to dampen expectations that the US would be willing and able to sort out every local con? ict. They were especially fearful of being drawn into a series of inconclusive and domestically unpopular foreign entanglements. But the events of September 11th 2001 created new imperatives for American activism. Washington now has major commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is ? nding it harder to limit those commitments. The days when the Pentagon could insist that it would not enter a con? ict without a clear exit strategy, and then pass on the thankless and demanding task of nation-building to others, have passed. This is already starting to have important consequences for doctrine development in the US. The Iraq experience shows that a new con? ict sequence is developing in which the length of the actual war is contracting, because there are few likely enemies able to withstand intense and precise ? repower. But the post-war activity, which can be both tough and deadly, may stretch out almost inde? itely. The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American doctrine, but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war. 3 The ‘European Security Strategy’ is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg At the Brussels summit in December 2003, European Union governments adopted a document entitled â€Å"A secure Europe in a better world† and subtitled †Å"European Security Strategy† (hereafter referred to as the ESS). 12 In the spring of 2003, the governments had given the EU’s High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, a mandate to draw up this document. 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